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Abstract
Background: The level of herd immunity before and after the first 2009 pandemic season is not precisely known,
and predicting the shape of the next pandemic H1N1 season is a difficult challenge.
Methods: This was a modelling study based on data on medical visits for influenza-like illness collected by the
French General Practitioner Sentinel network, as well as pandemic H1N1 vaccination coverage rates, and an
individual-centred model devoted to influenza. We estimated infection attack rates during the first 2009 pandemic
H1N1 season in France, and the rates of pre- and post-exposure immunity. We then simulated various scenarios in
which a pandemic influenza H1N1 virus would be reintroduced into a population with varying levels of protective
cross-immunity, and considered the impact of extending influenza vaccination.
Results: During the first pandemic season in France, the proportion of infected persons was 18.1% overall, 38.3%
among children, 14.8% among younger adults and 1.6% among the elderly. The rates of pre-exposure immunity
required to fit data collected during the first pandemic season were 36% in younger adults and 85% in the elderly.
We estimated that the rate of post-exposure immunity was 57.3% (95% Confidence Interval (95%CI) 49.6%-65.0%)
overall, 44.6% (95%CI 35.5%-53.6%) in children, 53.8% (95%CI 44.5%-63.1%) in younger adults, and 87.4% (95%CI
82.0%-92.8%) in the elderly.
The shape of a second season would depend on the degree of persistent protective cross-immunity to descen-
dants of the 2009 H1N1 viruses. A cross-protection rate of 70% would imply that only a small proportion of the
population would be affected. With a cross-protection rate of 50%, the second season would have a disease bur-
den similar to the first, while vaccination of 50% of the entire population, in addition to the population vaccinated
during the first pandemic season, would halve this burden. With a cross-protection rate of 30%, the second season
could be more substantial, and vaccination would not provide a significant benefit.
Conclusions: These model-based findings should help to prepare for a second pandemic season, and highlight
the need for studies of the different components of immune protection.
Background
On 11 June 2009, WHO announced the first influenza
pandemic of the 21st century, following the emergence of
a new influenza A/H1N1 virus in Mexico and its rapid
worldwide spread. By March 2010 most countries had
experienced a season of pandemic influenza H1N1, with
one or occasionally two peaks. Surveillance reports
showed that the burden of illness during this first season
did not differ much from that of recent seasonal influ-
enza epidemics [1-4], apart from a risk of unusually
severe pneumonia in young people[5-15]. However, the
true infection rates in the general population remain
poorly documented.
Two parameters are of critical importance for inter-
preting surveillance data collected during this first pan-
demic season: first, the proportion of the population that
was susceptible to infection before the 2009 pandemic
influenza A/H1N1 virus (hereafter referred to as 2009
H1N1) started to circulate; and second, the rate of
asymptomatic or paucisymptomatic infection. Several
studies suggest that a substantial proportion of the popu-
lation, and particularly the elderly, had pre-existing
cross-reactive antibodies against 2009 H1N1 [16-18],
and that asymptomatic or paucisymptomatic infection
was relatively frequent [18,19]. Consequently, the level of
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hindering attempts to predict the shape of a subsequent
pandemic H1N1 season.
Here we estimate the infection attack rates during the
first 2009 pandemic H1N1 season in France and attempt
to predict the shape of a second season of pandemic
H1N1 by using an individual-centred model [20]. We
estimated the first season infection attack rates in three
age groups: children, adults under 65, and the elderly,
based on different postulates for the proportion of
asymptomatic or paucisymptomatic infection. We then
fitted the model to these attack rates according to pre-
exposure cross-immunity and vaccine uptake, in order to
derive the size of the immune population after the first
pandemic season. Finally, we envisaged various scenarios
in which pandemic influenza H1N1 viruses escaping
immunity (due to viral evolution and loss of immunity)
would be reintroduced, and evaluated the likely impact of
extending 2009 H1N1 influenza vaccination.
Methods
Estimates of the infected population from national
surveillance data
We used data from the French General Practitioner
(GP) Sentinel network [21]. T h en e t w o r ki sac o n t i n u -
ous epidemiological surveillance system based on volun-
tary GPs and operating since 1984 in France. Sentinel
GPs report cases of influenza-like illness (ILI), defined
as abrupt-onset fever above 39°C accompanied by
respiratory signs and symptoms and myalgia or stiffness.
Weekly national ILI incidence was estimated from the
average number of ILI cases reported by GPs participat-
ing in surveillance during a week, multiplied by the ratio
of all French GPs to participating sentinel GPs [22]. Sur-
veillance criteria and procedures were not modified dur-
ing the first pandemic season.
Three age groups were considered: children (0-18 years),
younger adults (< 65 years), and the elderly (≥65 years). In
order to estimate the total size of the infected population,
we took into account the fact that some cases of ILI might
have been caused by other pathogens (poorly specific case
definition), and that not all cases of influenza virus infec-
tion would result in ILI corresponding to the case defini-
tion (lack of sensitivity). The latter cases would include
asymptomatic and paucisymptomatic infection. We also
took into account the fact that not all patients with typical
ILI seek medical advice (figure 1).
To overcome the poor specificity of the clinical case
definition, we calculated the excess of GP consultations
by children and adults under 65, relative to baseline
rates, using seasonal regression models fitted to histori-
cal data since 1985, as described elsewhere [23]. The
seasonal regression model was used to fit all-ages weekly
incidence data between 1985 to 2010, defining the first
French pandemic season as the period during which the
incidence of medical visits for ILI exceeded the upper
90% limit of the predicted incidence for at least two
consecutive weeks. The excess attributed to 2009 H1N1
was calculated in the same way, using a separate model
for each age group, by summing the weekly differences
between the observed and predicted incidence rates dur-
ing the first pandemic season. We used a different
method for elderly subjects, among whom the seasonal-
ity of medical visits for ILI was less clear-cut. We
assumed that 50% of medical visits for ILI in this age
group during the first pandemic season were associated
with 2009 H1N1 infection, while rates of 0-100% were
used to calculate confidence intervals. In children and
younger adults, excess medical visits attributed to 2009
H1N1 represented, on average, 85% of all medical visits
for ILI during the first pandemic season.
The proportion of patients with ILI who did not seek
medical advice was estimated from a monthly telephone
survey, conducted since May 2009, of a representative
sample of 800 members of the general population
(unpublished data). Overall, approximately 40% of per-
sons who reported having typical ‘flu-like symptoms did
not consult a GP, which is consistent with the results of a
prospective follow-up survey of 817 household contacts
of index cases with seasonal influenza virus infection
(43%) [24]. Finally, we used values from a meta-analysis
of experimental human influenza challenge studies show-
ing that approximately 65% of infected volunteers did not
develop typical ‘flu-like illness (33% did not have symp-
toms, 32% did not have fever), and who would not thus
have matched our case definition [25]. The proportion of
Figure 1 Relationship between medical visits for influenza-like
illness (ILI) and 2009 pandemic H1N1 infection. Numbers
associated with arrows indicate the percentages of the population
from a source compartment that are expected in the next
compartment, by age group (0-18, 19-64, ≥65)
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to be lower in children (45%), who are considered more
likely than adults to develop fever [26].
Population data and demographic parameters were
obtained from national censuses [27]. In France, pan-
demic influenza vaccination started in November 2009,
initially in groups at risk of complications. Influenza
vaccine coverage rates were obtained from the French
national security database. Adjuvanted vaccines were
used in the vast majority of cases. At the end of first
pandemic season the vaccine coverage rates were 12.6%
in children, 6.8% in younger adults, and 6.7% in the
elderly, most subjects having received a single injection.
Confidence limits for proportions were calculated with
the delta method.
Fitting the first pandemic H1N1 season
We used an individual-centred model, which permits rich
parameterization of the simulated population [20]. The
model included detailed descriptions of healthcare use
and interventions aiming at controlling influenza. It also
included demographic characteristics and household
sizes, and simulated the spread of influenza through the
use of randomly generated graphs. The random graphs
were a mixture of bidirectional graphs, comprising fully-
connected graphs for describing contact pattern within
the household, and Barabasi-Albert scale free graphs [28]
for describing other social contacts. The networks exhibit
a substantial level of clustering meaning that two simu-
lated individuals have an increased chance to be contacts
of each other given that they share a common network
contact. The connectivity of the simulated network fol-
lowed a power law distribution, with some individuals
having a large number of contacts which allows genera-
tion of superspreading events
The mean number of contacts per subject (the con-
nectivity of the network) was 13.9 overall (standard
deviation SD = 0.4), 15.3 (SD = 0.06) for children, 14.6
(SD = 0.59) for younger adults, and 5.1 (SD = 0.16) for
the elderly, in keeping with the results of recent large
surveys [29,30]. New networks were generated at each
simulation.
We made the following assumptions:
- We used realistic modelling of infectivity based on
experimental infection viral shedding data [25]. Rather
than assuming that infectivity was constant, we mod-
e l l e di ta saf u n c t i o nd e p e n d i n go nt h et i m ee l a p s e d
from infection [31]. We assumed the kinetics of infectiv-
ity had a gamma density function form (shape para-
meter = 5.2, scale parameter = 1), with an offset of 0.5
day (a latent period) and the function was truncated at
ten days. Infectivity did not depend on age [32] and
peaked at 2.1 days, with a calculated generation time of
2.6 days [33-35]. Infectivity was scaled during the fitting
process to adjust the observed data. The resulting prob-
ability of transmission during a hypothetical meeting
lasting throughout the infective period between a sus-
ceptible and a single infected individual was 40%.
- Children were fully susceptible to infection, and
unknown proportions of the younger adult and elderly
populations (to be calculated) were immune to 2009
H1N1 before it started to circulate. We assumed that
these immune subjects could not be infected, irrespec-
tive of the number of contacts with infectious persons
(“all-or-nothing” protection) [36].
- Subjects with asymptomatic infection were half as
infective as other subjects, and, among subjects who
consulted a GP, 40% did so the first day after symptom
onset, 30% the second day, and 30% later than the sec-
ond day [24].
- We postulated that 70% of individuals who consulted
a GP would remain confined to home for five days, as
recommended [37].
- We assumed that 50% of patients who visited a doc-
tor within two days of symptom onset received antiviral
therapy. We also assumed that antiviral treatment
reduced an individual’s infectiousness by 28% [38], and
their risk of severe influenza by 80% [5,7,12,13]. Anti-
viral prophylaxis was not considered, as it was not
recommended in France during the first H1N1 season.
- For consistency with observed vaccine coverage rates,
w ea s s u m e dt h a tv a c c i n a t i o nstarted 4 weeks after the
outset of the epidemic and increased linearly over the
next 7 weeks. We assumed that influenza vaccination
was 80% protective against infection and illness, irrespec-
tive of age, starting 15 days after vaccination. Vaccination
was administered irrespective of the individual’sh i s t o r y
of exposure or immunity to influenza viruses.
The model was calibrated by varying the proportion of
younger adults and elderly subjects with pre-exposure
immunity to fit the excess rates of medical visits attribu-
ted to 2009 H1N1 in the relevant age group. For each
set of parameters we ran 400 simulations, starting with
a single infectious individual at the first day of the first
French pandemic season. We classified as “outbreaks”
situations in which more than 5 per 1000 subjects were
infected [20]. Goodness-of-fit was optimized by mini-
m i s i n gt h ed i f f e r e n c eb ya g eg r o u pb e t w e e nt h e
observed and average rates in simulated outbreaks. The
size of the post-exposure immunized population was
estimated in each of the three age groups as the propor-
tion of individuals who were infected during the first
pandemic season or who were immunized naturally or
by vaccination prior to the first pandemic season. Confi-
dence limits for the rates of post-exposure immunity
were calculated, assuming that the rate of pre-exposure
immunity could vary between +5% and -5% of the
values obtained in the fitted model.
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population was susceptible before introducing infectious
individuals, all other parameters being equal, in order to
examine how a total lack of pre-exposure immunity
might influence the first pandemic season.
We calculated the effective reproductive number by
simulating the first generation of secondary cases after
introducing a single infectious subject, as described else-
where [20]. We also calculated a basic reproductive
number by setting all parameters related to healthcare
use (treatment, isolation, etc.), and the size of the pre-
exposure immune population, to zero.
Scenarios: reintroduction of pandemic H1N1 viruses with
modified antigenic properties, varying levels of cross-
protection, and different vaccination strategies
We simulated reintroduction of individuals infected by a
pandemic H1N1 virus exhibiting modified antigenic
properties (due to antigenic drift for example), at a rate
of 2/1000, in a population in which individuals who were
immune after the first season had varying levels of persis-
tent protective cross-immunity against the new virus
[39]. For these individuals, the chance of being infected
during contact with an infected individual was reduced
by 90% to 30%. All other parameters (transmission para-
meters, pathogenicity, contact networks and healthcare
use) remained identical to those used to adjust the first
epidemic curve. We completed each scenario by postulat-
ing that 10% to 50% of the entire population (or children)
who were not vaccinated during the first pandemic sea-
son would receive the 2009 H1N1 vaccine before the
reintroduction of infectious individuals. Vaccine effec-
tiveness was reduced in proportion to the postulated
cross-protection (vaccine effectiveness = 80% x cross-
protection), as the mechanism underlying the loss of
naturally acquired immunity would also concern vaccina-
tion-induced immunity, as vaccines being prepared for
the 2010-2011 season cover 2009 H1N1 [40].
Results
Estimates of the infected population from national
surveillance data
The first pandemic season in France lasted 16 weeks,
from 7 September 2009 to 27 December 2009. The inci-
dence of medical visits for ILI increased moderately and
remained at a stable low level during the first 6 weeks,
then increased more sharply and peaked between 6 and
12 December.
During the course of the first pandemic season, we
estimated that the proportions of the population who
consulted a GP for ILI were 4.86% overall (95%CI
3.62%-6.11%), 12.7% among children (95%CI 11.3%-
14.0%), 3.11% (95%CI 1.67%-4.56%) among younger
adults, and 0.34% among the elderly (95%CI 0-0.68%)
(figure 2). The estimated proportion of the population
infected by pandemic H1N1 was 18.1% overall (95%CI
12.2%-23.9%), 38.3% (95%CI 30.8%-45.9%) among chil-
dren, 14.8% (95%CI 7.01%-22.6%) among younger adults,
and 1.62% (95% CI 0%-3.60%) among the elderly.
Fitting the first pandemic H1N1 season
The model was fitted to the excess rates of medical vis-
its attributed to 2009 H1N1 by setting the pre-exposure
immune populations to 36% among younger adults and
85% among the elderly. The simulated proportion of
infected persons was 18.2% overall (InterQuartile Range
(IQR) 17.2%-20.7%), 39.3% in children (IQR 37.3%-
44.0%), 14.8% in younger adults (IQR 13.0%-17.1%) and
1.49% in the elderly (IQR 1.21%-1.76%). The simulated
outbreaks lasted an average of 13.1 weeks (IQR 11-14
weeks), 10% of outbreaks exceeding 16 weeks.
The post-exposure immune population represented
57.3% overall (95%CI 49.6%-65.0%), 44.6% (95% CI
35.5%-53.6%) in children, 53.8% (95%CI 44.5%-63.1%) in
younger adults, 87.4% (82.0%-92.8%) in the elderly.
Postulating no pre-exposure immunity in younger
adults and elderly persons, the simulated proportions of
infected persons would be 47.9% overall (IQR 46.2%-
49.7%), 64.2% in children (IQR 62.6%-65.4%), 47.6% in
younger adults (IQR 45.4%-49.7%) and 26.7% among the
elderly (IQR 25.2%-27.9%). An estimated 11.9% (11.4%-
12.4%) of the total population would consult a GP for
ILI caused by 2009 H1N1.
The effective reproductive number was 1.03 and the
basic reproductive number 1.54 (figure 3). An average of
1.57 persons were infected (1.11 children, 0.45 younger
adults and 0.01 elderly persons) when the index patient
Figure 2 Estimated excess medical visits for 2009 pandemic
H1N1 infection during the first season (flat blue lines) and
simulated curves of the first pandemic season obtained with
the calibrated model in the pre-exposure immunized
population (thin orange lines).
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0.01 elderly) when the index patient was a younger
adult, and 0.43 (0.14 children, 0.25 younger adults, 0.04
elderly persons) when the index patient was an elderly
person.
Scenarios: reintroduction of pandemic H1N1 viruses with
modified antigenic properties, varying levels of cross-
protection, and different vaccination strategies
As shown in Table 1, persistent cross-protection above
70% would be necessary to markedly limit the size of a
second pandemic season due to a virus with different
antigenic properties. Cross-protection of 50% would
imply attack rates of 23.1% overall, and rates notably
higher in younger adults and the elderly than during the
first pandemic season. Influenza vaccination of 30 to
50% of the population, in addition to the population
vaccinated during the first pandemic season, would
halve the attack rates, provided that cross-protection
was not below 50%. With cross-protection below 30%,
vaccination of 50% of the population would have little
impact. Vaccination of children alone would limit the
burden of influenza in all age groups if cross-protection
was between 50% and 70% and the vaccine coverage
rate exceeded 50%; in contrast, this measure would have
little impact in case of cross-protection greater than
70%; and would be barely effective in case of cross-
protection below 50%.
Discussion
Between 12% and 24% of the French population were
infected by the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus during
autumn and winter 2009. The cumulative incidence rate
was much higher in children (38.3%) than in younger
adults (14.8%) and the elderly (1.62%).
Here, using a modelling approach parameterized with
the best available epidemiological data for the French 2009
H1N1 season, and taking into account the behaviour of
patients with ILI and implementation of control measures,
we show that substantial pre-exposure immunity to 2009
H1N1 – 36% in younger adults and 85% in the elderly –
would be necessary to fit the observed incidence rates.
The likelihood of a major second 2009 H1N1 season
would depend on the degree of persistent protective cross-
immunity against new 2009 H1N1 variants. Assuming
cross-protection of 70% among people infected during the
first 2009 H1N1 season and among those who were
already protected, a second season would affect only a
small proportion of the population. With cross-protection
of 50%, the second season would have a disease burden
similar to that of the first season, and vaccination of 50%
of the entire population, in addition to the population vac-
cinated during the first pandemic season, would more
than halve this burden. With cross-protection of 30%, the
second season could be substantial, even if vaccine cover-
age increased by 50%.
Our estimates of the cumulative incidence rates of 2009
H1N1 infection during the first pandemic season are
slightly higher than those obtained in a serological survey
conducted in London and the West Midlands, which sug-
gested that 21.3% of < 5-year-olds, 42.0% of 5- to 14-
year-olds, 20.6% of 15- to 24-year-olds, 6.2% of 25- to 44-
year-olds and only 0.9% of the elderly were infected [18].
These incidence rates were based on differences in the
proportion of samples with haemagglutination inhibition
titres of 1:32 or higher between 2008 and September
2009, and did not take into account 2009 H1N1 infec-
tions occurring in late October-early November 2009.
Also, 11% of individuals who had PCR-confirmed 2009
H1N1 infection had not seroconverted after 21 days,
indicating that 2009 infection rates were underestimated.
In another study, post-exposure 2009 H1N1 seropreva-
lence rates were 45% in children aged 10 to 19 years, 14%
to 22% in adults under 60, and 5% to 26% in adults aged
60 to 89 [41], giving an overall rate of 21.5%. Our find-
ings are compatible with these data. Interestingly, in this
latter study, several findings pointed to protective cross-
i m m u n i t yd u et oe x p o s u r et op r e v i o u sH 1 N 1v i r u s e s .I n
the elderly population, antibodies to the 1918 H1N1
virus were found in 48% to 57% of cases, while antibodies
to the 1957 H1N1 virus (a descendant of 1918 H1N1)
were found in 37% to 58% of adults aged 40 to 59. Cross-
Figure 3 Distribution of the number of secondary infections
engendered by a single infectious individual in a population of
younger adults and elderly subjects with pre-exposure
immunity (R) and in an entirely susceptible population (R0),
according to age group. 4000 simulations were made.
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Page 5 of 9Table 1 Simulated infection rates during a second pandemic influenza H1N1 season according to persistent cross-protection and increasing vaccine coverage
Increased vaccine coverage
(%)
All ages 0-18 yrs
Persistent protective cross-immunity (%) No vaccination 10 30 50 30 50 70
90 2.35 (0.66-2.85)
1.76 (0.48-2.49)
0.29 (0.12-0.36)
1.65 (0.51-2.31)
1.42 (0.53-1.89)
1.11 (0.31-1.35)
0.16 (0.06-0.18)
1.02 (0.35-1.35)
0.68 (0.26-0.88)
0.59 (0.20-0.72)
0.10 (0.00-0.12)
0.53 (0.23-0.66)
0.30 (0.13-0.39)
0.26 (0.12-0.30)
0.05 (0.00-0.06)
0.23 (0.13-0.26)
1.05 (0.39-1.58)
1.40 (0.33-1.86)
0.21 (0.06-0.30)
1.12 (0.34-1.44)
0.65 (0.26-0.88)
1.21 (0.33-1.70)
0.14 (0.00-0.18)
0.91 (0.27-1.21)
0.40 (0.13-0.57)
1.26 (0.31-1.94)
0.16 (0.06-0.24)
0.88 (0.24-1.32)
70 14.0 (11.2-18.4)
10.3 (7.33-14.3)
2.65 (1.94-3.63)
9.91 (7.29-13.9)
8.44 (2.68-13.8)
6.17 (1.66-10.4)
1.56 (0.55-2.48)
5.92 (1.71-9.82)
3.51 (0.83-5.04)
2.81 (0.59-3.94)
0.66 (0.18-0.97)
2.61 (0.59-3.65)
1.24 (0.48-1.62)
1.13 (0.30-1.20)
0.29 (0.06-0.36)
1.02 (0.32-1.18)
6.20 (1.54-9.96)
6.05 (1.63-10.2)
1.45 (0.42-2.42)
5.32 (1.37-8.78)
4.76 (1.36-7.11)
6.56 (1.45-10.2)
1.46 (0.42-2.18)
5.31 (1.31-8.39)
2.73 (0.66-4.30)
4.61 (0.69-8.14)
1.06 (0.18-1.76)
3.60 (0.63-6.20)
50 33.2 (30.9-36.3)
23.1 (20.7-25.8)
8.85 (7.70-10.1)
23.1 (20.7-25.2)
29.4 (26.3-33.3)
21.3 (18.4-24.3)
7.99 (7.09-9.03)
20.9 (18.6-23.5)
20.2 (18.1-25.4)
15.5 (12.0-20.4)
5.76 (4.73-7.27)
15.0 (12.4-19.2)
14.0 (9.91-19.4)
11.6 (6.95-15.5)
4.16 (2.55-5.82)
10.9 (0.69-15.2)
25.6 (23.8-28.4)
20.9 (18.4-24.2)
7.82 (6.91-8.97)
19.8 (18.0-22.8)
21.4 (19.6-24.6)
19.5 (16.4-22.8)
7.13 (6.42-8.18)
17.9 (15.6-20.6)
17.3 (14.9-21.8)
18.7 (16.0-23.7)
6.47 (5.33-8.24)
16.4 (13.7-20.7)
30 49.7 (48.3-51.4)
35.2 (32.5-37.8)
16.6 (15.2-17.9)
35.4 (33.2-37.5)
46.5 (44.9-48.9)
34.0 (31.6-36.3)
15.7 (14.4-17.0)
33.8 (32.3-36.2)
43.6 (41.3-45.9)
31.7 (28.9-33.7)
14.7 (13.6-15.8)
31.6 (29.1-33.4)
39.7 (37.5-42.5)
29.1 (27.2-31.6)
13.7 (12.8-14.5)
29.0 (27.3-31.1)
45.1 (43.0-47.1)
34.6 (32.4-36.9)
15.9 (14.9-16.9)
33.9 (31.9-35.8)
41.7 (40.2-44.0)
32.6 (30.3-35.3)
15.1 (13.9-16.6)
31.8 (30.2-34.0)
39.8 (37.7-42.4)
32.8 (30.0-36.0)
15.2 (14.1-16.4)
31.5 (29.2-34.2)
In each cell, mean infection rates per 100, in children (0-18 years), adults under 65 years and elderly (standard style) and total population (bold style) are given with their interquartile ranges (in parentheses).
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9reactivity between antibodies elicited by H1N1 viruses
circulating up to 1957 is further supported by the anti-
genic similarity [42] and reported cross-neutralization
[43] between these viruses and 2009 H1N1. Together,
these findings help to explain the low attack rates
observed in the adult and elderly populations. However,
the precise level of pre- or post-exposure immunity to
2009 H1N1 is difficult to evaluate. Serological analyses
only measure adaptive immunity, failing to quantify cel-
lular and innate immunity. Moreover, the protection
associated with haemagglutination inhibition or neutrali-
zation antibody titres is not known for 2009 H1N1.
W ef o u n de v i d e n c eo fe l e v a t e dl e v e l so fp r e - e x p o s u r e
immunity in the French adult and elderly populations,
yielding a reproductive number slightly higher than 1.
Such a low reproductive number is supported by the
highly variable patterns of the first 2009 H1N1 seasons
across various countries, with one or two peaks, a lack of
spatial synchrony, and moderate clinical attack rates [44].
We estimated the reproductive number on our data
using the early epidemic growth rate (fitted on incidence
data from one week before to two weeks after the epi-
demic onset, using the method described in [45], with a
generation time of 2.6 days and a ratio of infectious per-
iod to the generation time of 0.61). The value obtained
(1.18) was close to our estimate and lower than the aver-
age estimate of 1.3 during seasonal influenza epidemics
in France [46]. Estimates of the final size of the infected
population, taking into account relative susceptibilities in
different age groups also closely matched our estimates
(17.5%) [47]. However, our reproductive number was
substantially lower than those reported in the US or
Mexico for the first pandemic season [33,34]. This appar-
ent discrepancy may be the consequence of estimations
in different time, settings or countries but may also be
explained by our modelling framework. In scale-free net-
works of finite size, the heterogeneity of scale-free con-
nectivity patterns favors epidemic spreading by lowering
the epidemic threshold [48]. In contrast with homoge-
neous network, the scale-free network allows epidemic
spreading for a low average number of infections pro-
duced by an infected individual [49].
Our calculations of pre-exposure protective cross-
immunity may have been influenced by assumptions
concerning the proportion of infected individuals who
did not develop ILI. It has been estimated that the pro-
portion of all infected subjects who visited their GP in
France was 19.6% among pregnant women [19], a figure
in line with our postulate of 21% in the 19- to 64-year
age group. When we postulated lower proportions of
individuals with ILI among those infected with 2009
H1N1 [18], the cumulative incidence rates of infection
increased and the level of pre-exposure immunity neces-
sary to fit the epidemic curve therefore decreased. In
this case, transmission parameters would also increase,
and our estimates of the post-exposure immunized
population would not be markedly affected.
There are few reports on cross-protection between
successive pandemic or seasonal influenza seasons. The
cross-protective effect was estimated to range from 35%
to 94% for clinical illness between the spring and sum-
mer waves and the autumn wave during the 1918 pan-
demic [50], while no evidence of cross-protection was
found between the autumn wave and a third winter
wave. As the 1918 pandemic H1N1 virus was antigeni-
cally close to 2009 H1N1, a strong decline in protection
could occur if the same situation is repeated. Genetic
characterization of 2009 H1N1 has already identified dif-
ferent evolving clades and complex spatio-temporal
dynamics [51], and significant drift before the next sea-
son is likely.
Mass vaccination with the 2009 H1N1 influenza vaccine
would be effective only within a limited range of cross-
protection against a re-emerging H1N1 strain. Even if
cross-reactive antibodies might have been elicited by adju-
vanted influenza vaccination (used in late 2009/early 2010
in France), there is no evidence that adjuvanted vaccines
provide superior cross-protection than naturally-acquired
infection against drifted strains, and we therefore applied
the same reasoning to individuals who were naturally
immunized and those who were vaccinated.
The next pandemic season, if it occurs, could affect
more adults and elderly subjects than the first. This was
the case in past pandemics [52] and has been carefully
analyzed in a network-based modelling study, in which
a shift to older age between the first and subsequent
seasons was predicted [53]. As the case-fatality ratio was
higher in the adult and elderly populations than in chil-
dren [15,54], the mortality burden of a subsequent
H1N1 pandemic season due to a virus with unchanged
pathogenicity could be higher than during the first
season.
Conclusions
Pre-exposure immunity to 2009 H1N1 influenza virus
was higher than anticipated in French adults and elderly
people. A sustained high level of cross-protection
against descendants of the 2009 H1N1 virus would be
necessary to avoid a second significant 2009 H1N1 sea-
son. Extending influenza vaccination across all age
groups would be effective if cross-protection against
descendants of the 2009 H1N1 virus ranged between
30% to 70%, but would not provide a significant benefit
in other situations. This study therefore highlights the
need for comprehensive studies of the different compo-
nents of immune protection, and the need to maintain
worldwide virological and ILI surveillance for early
detection of antigenic drift.
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